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A Fully Resilient Cyber-Secure Synchronization
Strategy for AC Microgrids
Mahdieh S. Sadabadi, Member, IEEE, Subham Sahoo, Member, IEEE, and Frede Blaabjerg, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This letter focuses on resilient synchronization in
networked AC microgrids under cyber-attacks, where attackers
aim to desynchronize converters by injecting bounded false data
to communication and control channels. To this end, a resilient
cooperative control framework for the secondary frequency
regulation in AC microgrids is developed. The proposed resilient
distributed control strategy achieves synchronization regardless
of the existence of cyber-attacks. Moreover, it offers the maximum
level of resilience, i.e. it guarantees resilient synchronization even
if all distributed generation units in microgrids are subject to
cyber-attacks. Theoretical analysis and verification case studies
are carried out in order to demonstrate the advantages and
performance of the proposed resilient cooperative control.
Index Terms—AC microgrids, resilient synchronization, dis-
tributed control, false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, sec-
ondary control, attack-resilient control.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ICROGRID technology is becoming ever more relianton distributed control and communication networks.
While distributed control strategies could improve scalability
and reliability in microgrids, they pose major cybersecurity
challenges. The existence of cyber-attacks in microgrid control
systems can easily lead to the loss of synchronization and
might result in instability issues.
To deal with cybersecurity issues in AC microgrids, an
observer-based attack-resilient distributed control approach for
synchronization in islanded microgrids has been proposed
[1]. In this work, multiple confidence and trust factors are
developed to estimate the effects of cyber-attacks. However,
the online calculation of these factors increases the compu-
tational burden of this approach. Furthermore, [1] considers
only constant and time-independent cyber-attacks and also
assumes that more than half of the neighbors of the attacked
distributed generation (DG) units should be healthy. Resilient
cooperative control strategies have been developed in [2], [3].
In these approaches, the distributed controller is augmented
with a hidden layer whose duty is to mitigate the adverse
effects of cyber-attacks. However, to provide an attack-resilient
feature, they rely on a strong assumption that the hidden
layer is not infiltrated by cyber-attacks. An asynchrony in-
dex criterion for the detection of stealth attacks has been
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proposed in [4]. The proposed mitigation platform in [4]
guarantees resilient synchronization for up to N − 1 (in a
system with N converters) attacked converters. A resilient dis-
tributed secondary control for islanded AC microgrids based
on a weighted mean subsequence reduced algorithm has been
proposed in [5]. However, the proposed approach requires a
specific connectivity level for the connectivity of underlying
communication graph. The authors in [6], [7] have established
full resilience against data integrity attacks in AC microgrids,
where the adversary attempts to increase the total generation
cost by manipulating the cost parameters. However to the
best of authors’ knowledge, the development of a resilient
distributed secondary control, which guarantees full resilience
in synchronization is still an open question.
This letter introduces a novel resilient secondary frequency
control for islanded AC microgrids, which relies on a re-
silience index. It is shown that increasing the resilience index
enhances the resilience of synchronization to false data in-
jection (FDI) cyber-attacks. The proposed resilient distributed
control framework offers the maximum level of resilience, i.e.
it guarantees resilient synchronization for up to N (out of N )
attacked DG units.
Preliminaries: In graph theory, a graph is called undirected
if all edges are bidirectional and no directions are associated
with them.
Notation: Throughout this letter, 1n is an n × 1 vector of
ones, 0n is an n×1 zero vector, In is an n×n identity matrix,
0n×m is a zero matrix whose dimension is n ×m, and XT
denotes the transpose of matrix X . R+ and R≥0 respectively
are a set of positive and non-negative real values.
II. STANDARD PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL IN
ISLANDED MICROGRIDS
In an AC microgrid with N DG units, two of the key
secondary control objectives are frequency synchronization









mPjPj(t), ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} (1b)
where ωi is the angular frequency of DG i, ω0 is nominal
reference angular frequency, Pi is the measured active power
of DG i, and mPi is the P -ω droop coefficient employed in
the active power secondary control layer.
To achieve synchrony in AC microgrids, a hierarchical con-
trol strategy consisting of a primary droop and a cooperative
secondary control is adopted. This strategy is shown in Fig. 1.
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A. Primary Frequency Droop Control
Droop control is one of widely-used control strategies for
the primary control of islanded AC microgrids. The P -ω droop
control mechanism can be written as [1]:
ωi = ωni −mPiPi, (2)
where ωni is the set-point of the droop mechanism, which is
chosen by a secondary control layer.
B. Cooperative Secondary Frequency Control
The primary droop control results in a deviation in the
frequency of microgrids from their reference setpoints. To
address this issue, secondary control strategies are utilized to
provide appropriate setpoints ωni =
∫
uωnidt for the primary
control in (2), where the auxiliary control uωni = ω̇ni is given








+ gi (ωi − ω0)), (3)
where Ni is the set of neighbors of DG i, gi ∈ R≥0 is a
pinning gain, and Kω ∈ R+ is a coupling gain. Assuming that
the associated neighbor-to-neighbor communication digraph
G in (3) contains a spanning tree and gi is non-zero for at
least one DG, it can be shown that lim
t→∞
ωi(t) = ω0 and the
proportional active current sharing in (1b) is guaranteed [8].
Although the distributed cooperative control in (3) guar-
antees synchronization, it has been shown in [9] that (3)
is not resilient against FDI cyber-attacks on control and
communication channels. Hence, it mandates the design of
a fully resilient cooperative secondary frequency control to
guarantee (1) despite the presence of cyber-attacks.
Remark 1: Inverter-based DG units have nonlinear dynam-
ics in direct-quadrature (dq) reference frame, which include
load characteristics. As fully described in [10], by virtue of
an input–output feedback linearization approach, the nonlinear
dynamics of DG units can be transformed to linear dynamics.
As a result, the secondary frequency control is transformed to
a first-order synchronization problem in (3).
III. COOPERATIVE RESILIENT FREQUENCY CONTROL
This section discusses the development of a resilient cooper-
ative secondary frequency control for islanded AC microgrids
under cyber-attacks. In what follows, it is worth notifying that
the communication graph represented by a Laplacian matrix L
is assumed to be connected and undirected. Hence, L = LT .
A. Proposed Attack-Resilient Distributed Control Strategy
To accomplish full resilience for synchrony in AC mi-
crogrids under FDI cyber-attacks, the following cooperative












ηij (σi − σj) ,


























































Fig. 1. Single-line diagram of a cyber-physical system consisting of N
grid-forming converters in an AC microgrid managed by a cooperative cyber
topology – cyber-attacks (in red bolts) launched into communication channels
and local control inputs.
where σi and ρi are auxiliary states of the controller of DG i,
τσ ∈ R+, τρ ∈ R+, K ∈ R+, γ ∈ R+, and β ∈ R+, called
resilience index, are the control parameters. In the proposed
attack-resilient cooperative control, the auxiliary state σi as
well as the resilience index β are added to enhance resilience
against cyber-attacks, whereas ρi is added to prevent unwanted
oscillations in the frequency response of DG units. In order
to increase the time-constant of the dynamics of the auxiliary
states, γ/τσ is chosen sufficiently high. By doing a steady-
state analysis similar to [8], it can be shown that the proposed
resilient cooperative control in (4) guarantees the frequency
synchronization and proportional active power sharing in (1).
B. FDI Cyber-attacks Formulation
The proposed distributed control framework in (4) relies on
exchanging Ψj = {σj , ωj , Pj} amongst different converters.
Under potential FDI cyber-attacks on the transmitted data and
local control inputs, one may obtain:
ω̂[i,j] = ωi + λω[i,j]δω[i,j] , P̂[i,j] = Pi + λP[i,j]δP[i,j] ,
σ̂[i,j] = σi + λσ[i,j]δσ[i,j] , ûω[i] = uωi + λuω[i] δu[i] ,
(5)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and j ∈ Ni, where ω̂[i,j], P̂[i,j], σ̂[i,j], and
û[i] are the disrupted data sent to/received by converter j.
In the presence of an attack on the communication of ωi (σi,
Pi) from converter i to converter j, λω[i,j] = 1 (λσ[i,j] = 1,
λP[i,j] = 1) and λω[i,j] = 0 (λσ[i,j] = 0, λP[i,j] = 0) otherwise.
Similarly, if there exists an attack on uωi , λuω[i] = 1, otherwise
λuω[i] = 0. It is assumed that δω[i,j] , δP[i,j] , δσ[i,j] , and δuω[i]
in (5) are unknown but uniformly bounded.
The cyber-attacks in (5) can be represented in a vec-
tor form as dωn =
[
dωn1 , . . . , dωnN
]T
and dσ =
[dσ1 , . . . , dσN ]
T , where dωni =
∑N
j=1 ηj,i(λω[j,i]δω[j,i] +
λP[j,i]mPjδP[j,i] + λσ[j,i]δσ[j,i]) + λu[i]δu[i] and dσi =∑N
j=1 ηi,j(λω[j,i]δω[j,i] + λP[j,i]mPjδP[j,i]).
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C. Lyapunov-based Stability Analysis
The proposed resilient cooperative control approach in (4)








+gi(ωi +mPiPi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωni
− (ω0 +mPiPi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωn0
))
−K(ωni − ρi) + β
∑
j∈Ni
ηij (σi − σj) ,








τρρ̇i = ωni − ρi.
(6)
In the proposed distributed control strategy in (4), it is
assumed that the pinning gain gi is non-zero (a positive value)
for at least one DG unit. Since the non-zero value of gi affects
the convergence rate of the distributed control strategy in (6)
and the speed of frequency synchronization in an islanded
AC microgrid, these non-zero values of gi are chosen to be
equal to β, where β is selected to be sufficiently high. The
choice of β will be discussed in Subsection III-D. A larger
value of the non-zero pining gain leads to a more effective
communication between the chosen pinned and unpinned DG
units; thus, the reference frequency ω0 can propagate faster
in the neighbor-neighbor communication network [9]. In light
of this and considering the fact that the time-constant of the
auxiliary state dynamics is selected to have a large value, the
states of (6) converge to their steady-state values quickly. As a
result, mPiPi of all DG units converges to a certain common
steady value fast. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that ωn0
is equal for all DG units. It is worth notifying that such an
assumption has already been used in previous studies, e.g. for
AC microgrids in [2] and for DC microgrids in [11].
The proposed cooperative control can be approximated and
represented in a vector form as follows:
ω̇n = −Kω (L + A) (ωn − 1Nωn0)−K(ωn − ρ) + βLσ,
τσσ̇ = −γσ − βLωn,
τρρ̇ = ωn − ρ,
(7)
where σ = [σ1, . . . , σN ]
T and ρ = [ρ1, . . . , ρN ]
T , ωn =
[ωn1 , . . . , ωnN ]
T , and A = diag (g1, . . . , gN ). Without loss
of generality, the pinning gain matrix A can be rewritten as
A = β diag (g̃1, . . . , g̃N ), where g̃i = 1 if and only if DG i
is a chosen pinned unit; otherwise, g̃i = 0. Note that the term
βg̃i(ωni−ωn0) is not subject to FDI cyber-attacks as this term
does not rely on any communications amongst neighbouring
DG units and their local controllers.
In the presence of FDI cyber-attacks, the closed-loop system
in (7) can be represented in the state-space form as follows:




















is the equilibrium of (4) in
the absence of the cyber-attacks d. Note that ω̄n is the steady-
state value of ωni(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The state space matrices
(A,B) are defined as follows:
A=
 −Kω (L + A)−KIN βL KIN−τ−1σ βL −γτ−1σ IN 0N
τ−1ρ IN 0N −τ−1ρ IN
,
B=
 IN 0N0N τ−1σ IN
0N 0N
 (9)
The following lemma analyzes the stability of (8) using
Lyapunov stability theory.
Lemma 1: A in (9) is a Hurwitz (stable) matrix.
Proof 1: Let us assume that d = 0. To show A is Hurwitz,
it is sufficient to show the globally asymptotic stability of the





 IN 0N 0N0N τσIN 0N
0N 0N KτρIN
 e. (10)
The time derivative of V(e) along the trajectories (8) is
obtained as follows:
V̇(e) =−Kω(ωn − ω̄n)T (L + A) (ωn − ω̄n)− γσTσ
−K(ωn − ρ)T (ωn − ρ).
(11)
Therefore, V̇(e) < 0, ∀ e 6= 0. Hence, the origin in (8)
is globally asymptotically stable. As a result, A in (9) is a
Hurwitz matrix.
D. Attack-Resilience Analysis
The following theorem shows that the proposed resilient
cooperative control in (4) guarantees the maximum scale of
resilience in presence of cyber-attacks in (5). As a result, even
if N DG units are attacked, attack-resilience is achieved. More
specifically, we will show that in an islanded AC microgrid
augmented with the proposed resilient cooperative frequency
control (4), the frequency synchronization and proportional
active power sharing in (1) are achieved provided that the
resilience index β in (1) is sufficiently large. The details are
given in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Consider the proposed cooperative frequency
control in (4). It is assumed that all DG units are subject to
FDI cyber-attacks d(t). For a sufficiently large value of the
resilience index β, the objectives stated in (1) are guaranteed.
Proof 2: Since all DG units are attacked by false data
injection in (5), all entries of d(t) are non-zero. From the
linear dynamics in (8), the closed-loop error vector e can be
obtained as follows:






























and ∆d is a constant vector.
Note that, since A is a stable matrix, limt→∞
∥∥eAte(0)∥∥ = 0.
According to [12], A−1 is obtained as follows:
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TABLE I
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED RESILIENT COOPERATIVE CONTROL STRATEGY (4) IN ISLANDED AC MICROGRIDS.
Features [1] [9] [5] [3] [2] [4] This letter




Case-dependent2 Case-dependent N 3 N
2
N − 1 N
Additional resources × × × Virtual control layer Virtual control layer × ×
1 N denotes the total number of DG units in AC microgrid.
2 It depends largely on the number of attacked cyber links/nodes, which ultimately affects the algebraic connectivity of cyber-graph.
3 It assumes that the virtual control layer is not subject to cyber-attacks.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE AC MICROGRID UNDER STUDY IN SECTION IV.
Converters Li = 3.4 µH and Ci = 50 µF .
Lines R12 = 0.23 Ω, L12 = 318.31 µH , R23 = 0.35 Ω, L23 =
1.8462 mH , R34 = 0.35 Ω, and L34 = 1.8462 mH .
Controller g̃1 = 1, g̃2 = g̃3 = g̃4 = 0, τσ = τφ = 0.01, Kω = 5,















where a = −(Kω (L + A) + β
2
γ L
2)−1 and b = − τσγ (IN +
β2
γ LaL). For a sufficiently large value of β, a converges
to −ε1N1TN , where ε ∈ R+ is a sufficiently small scalar
(limβ→∞ a = 0N ). Moreover, considering that the time-
constant γ/τσ is large, b also converges to a zero matrix.
Hence, it can be shown that
lim
β→∞
A−1∆ = 0N×1 (15)
Note that the above equality is satisfied for every possible
attack vector d even if all DG units are attacked. As a result of
(13) and (15), limt→∞ ‖e(t)‖ = 0. Therefore, for a sufficiently
large value of β, e(t) converges to zero in the steady-state.
This implies that limt→∞ ωi(t) = ω0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and limt→∞mP1P1(t) = · · · = limt→∞mPNPN (t) in the
presence of the cyber-attack vector d.
Remark 2: The value of β in (4) affects cyber-attack
mitigation and transient behaviour in frequency regulation
and power sharing responses. An optimal value of β can be
found by the optimal solution of an optimization problem
with multiple objectives such as minimization of the L2 gain
of the dynamical system in (8) considering d as a bounded
disturbance, convergence rate, and robustness to time delays.
Remark 3: The main features of the proposed resilient
cooperative frequency control (4) is that it provides full
resilience to false data injection attacks on communication
channels in the secondary frequency control of islanded AC
microgrids. Moreover, although the proposed control structure
is distributed, the design of control parameters for each DG
unit is decentralized and does not require the knowledge of
the entire microgrid and/or communication graph. Table I
summarizes the main features of the proposed resilient control
strategy in comparison to the existing methods in [1]–[5]
and [9].
IV. RESULTS
The proposed resilient distributed secondary control is tested
on an islanded AC microgrids shown in Fig. 1 comprising of
N = 4 converter-interfaced DG units. The microgrid operates
at a global voltage and frequency reference V ∗ = 310 V and
f0 = 50 Hz. Since each converter has an equal capacity of
10 kVA, the droop coefficients mPi = 0.00014 radW
−1/s
are equal. Therefore, active power will be shared equally.
The system and control parameters are given in Table II. The
switching frequency and sampling time are fs = 10 kHz and
Ts = 20 µs, respectively. The performance of the microgrid is
evaluated in terms of synchronization under several types of
cyber-attacks.
The first case study evaluates the performance of the pro-
posed resilient cooperative controller and the conventional
cooperative frequency approach in (3) to load changes and
resilient against cyber-attacks. To this end, it is worth notifying
that: (i) a load of 1.55 kW is suddenly connected to point of
common coupling 3 (PCC 3) at t = 5 s; (ii) time-varying false
data dωn1 = 6.3 cos(t), dωn2 = −3.14, dωn3 = 6.3 sin(2t),
and dωn4 = 3.14 are injected into all four converters at t = 7 s;
(iii) a load of 1.55 kW is suddenly disconnected from PCC 3 at
t = 9 s. The frequency responses and active power capability
of DG units are depicted in Fig. 2.
In the second case study, we consider the impact of white
noise on exchange data Pj amongst the controllers of neigh-
boring DG units. Moreover, in order to show the performance
of the cooperative controller in (4) under non-identical P −ω
droop coefficients, it is assumed that mP1 = mP4 = 0.00014
radW−1/s and mP2 = mP3 = 0.00007 radW
−1/s. The
results of this case study are shown in Fig. 3.
As one can observe from Fig. 2 (c)-(d) and Fig. 3 (c)-
(d), the conventional cooperative control can synchronize the
frequencies of DG units to the nominal frequency of 50 Hz
during the load change at t = 5 s; moreover, the total load
power is shared amongst all DG units based on their active
power rating. However, the synchronization and power sharing
is lost once the attacks are launched. Furthermore, Fig. 2
(a)-(b) and Fig. 3 (a)-(b) indicate that the proposed resilient
cooperative control approach in (4) mitigates the adverse
effects of the cyber-attack; as a result, the synchronization
is achieved in the presence of the attacks.
In the third case study, it is assumed that the cooperative
frequency control system in (4) is subject to FDI attacks
dσ(t) (dσ1 = 6.3 cos(t), dσ2 = −3.14, dσ3 = 6.3 sin(2t),














































Performance of proposed resilient 
cooperative frequency control
Launching attacks at t=7 s
Launching attacks at t=7 s
Fig. 2. Performance of the proposed resilient cooperative controller in (4)
and the conventional cooperative frequency controller in (3) to load changes
at t = 5 s and t = 9 s and FDI attacks dω launched at t = 7 s: (a)-(b)
frequency and active power of DGs via (4) and (c)-(d) frequency and active






































noise attacks at t=7 s
Launching white
noise attacks at t=7 s







Fig. 3. Performance of the proposed and the conventional cooperative
frequency controller in (4) and (3) with non-identical P−ω droop coefficients
to load changes at t = 5 s and t = 9 s and white noise cyber-attacks launched
at t = 7 s: (a)-(b) frequency and active power of DG units via (4) and (c)-(d)
frequency and active power of DG units via (3).
frequencies, active power, and reactive power of DGs as well
as the direct component of PCC voltage signals. The results
guarantee the resilience of the proposed cooperative frequency
control against FDI attacks dσ .
The next case study carried out in Fig. 5 demonstrates
the maximum level of resilience offered by the proposed
distributed secondary control in (4). To this end, it is as-
sumed that all the transmitted data in the microgrid frequency
control system are subject to FDI attacks. This means that
all exchanged data (ωi, Pi, σi) from converter i to converter
j 6= i, ∀i, j = 1, . . . , 4, are disrupted according to (5) at
t = 2.5 s. The frequency, active power, and PCC voltage of
converters are shown in Fig. 5. Upon launching the FDI attacks












































 d (t) at t=3 s
Launching FDI
attack d (t) at t=3 s
Launching FDI
attack d (t) at t=3 s
Launching FDI
attack d (t) at t=3 s
Fig. 4. Performance of the proposed resilient cooperative controller in (4) to
FDI cyber-attacks dσ(t) launched at t = 3 s: (a) frequency of DG units, (b)
DG units’ active power, (c) direct components of PCC voltages, and (d) DG
units’ reactive power.



























(a) Launching FDI attacks at t=2.5 s
Launching FDI attacks at t=2.5 s
Launching FDI attacks at t=2.5 s
Fig. 5. Performance of the proposed resilient cooperative control strategy in
(4) when all exchanged data are attacked at t = 2.5 s: (a) frequency of DG
units, (b) DG units’ active power, and (c) direct components of PCC voltages.
at t = 2.5 s, the proposed distributed control mechanism at-
tenuates the adverse effects of attacks such that sychronization
and proportionate active power sharing is not disrupted.
The last case study in Fig. 6 reveals the effects of the
resilience index β in cyber-attack resilience and microgrid
dynamics in the presence of a load change at DG 1. From
this figure, it is clear to see that increasing β decreases the
adverse effects of cyber-attacks on the frequency disruption.
However, since β plays the role of an integral gain for the
proposed resilient cooperative controller in (4), increasing the
value of β might increase the overshoot and/or oscillation
in the dynamics responses of islanded microgrids and might
result in system instability. This has been highlighted in Fig. 7
where the impacts of β in (4) can be directly attributed to the
increased oscillatory behavior or system instability.
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Fig. 6. Effects of the resilience index β in synchronization in the presence of a load change at t = 3 s and launching FDI cyber-attacks at t = 6 s: (a)-(b)
frequency and active power of DG units for β = 1, (c)-(d) frequency and active power of DG units for β = 5, (e)-(f) frequency and active power of DG





































Fig. 7. Effects of β in starting up the cooperative resilient controller in (4). Increasing β results in more oscillation or instability in frequency responses.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter presents a novel resilient secondary frequency
control of AC microgrids. The proposed control framework
offers maximum scale of false data injection cyber-attack
resilience, as it guarantees the synchronization even if all
converters are attacked. The performance of the proposed
resilient secondary frequency control is evaluated under sev-
eral case studies. The design of a resilient distributed control
approach for voltage regulation and reactive power sharing
in islanded AC microgrids and the optimal selection of the
resilient parameter β will be considered as a future scope of
work.
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